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The  1948  release  of  Río  Escondido was  a  triumph  of  the  Mexican  film  industry.  It 
represented the possibilities that seemed in reach of the postwar Mexican film sector: sovereign 
control of an economically viable, artistically vibrant, nationally dominant, mass-cultural medium 
capable of producing Mexican stories, myths, and images. 
 
In the film, the President of the Republic-played in a cameo by President Miguel Alemán 
himself-personally sends Rosaura Salazar, portrayed by María Félix, to the town of Río Escondido 
to teach in a public school. He explains to her that it is her duty to fulfill the nation’s destiny for a 
modern  literate  society.  In  the  town,  aided  by an  idealistic  young  doctor,  played by Fernando 
Fernández, she challenges local corruption and intimidation-loyally serving the education program 
of  the  central  government.  She  invokes  national  symbols  of  liberal  progress  and  patriotism, 
especially Benito Juárez, in teaching her indian students. Although the film is paternalistic toward 
indian culture, glorifies the benevolent centralized authority of the state, and often treats various 
characters as sentimental stereotypes, these flaws are the same ones common to commercial mass 
culture worldwide. What is significant about Río Escondido is its nationalist plot and theme, and the 
way they were expressed  in  Emilio  Fernández’s  script  and  direction  and through the powerful 
images  created  by Gabriel  Figueroa’s  award-winning  cinematography.  Whatever  its  flaws,  Río 
Escondido is a decidedly Mexican film of very high technical quality. 1 
 
The  release  of  Río  Escondido came  during  a  period  of  tremendous  quantitative  and 
qualitative growth in the Mexican film sector. Movies represented Mexico’s third largest industry 
by 1947, employing 32,000 workers. Mexico had 72 producers of films who invested 66,000,000 
pesos (approximately U.S. $13 million) in filming motion pictures in 1946 and 1947, four active 
studios with 40,000,000 pesos of invested capital, and national and international distributors. There 
were approximately 1,500 theaters throughout the nation, with about 200 in Mexico City alone.2 
Mexico’s films in the late 1940s would command over 40% of domestic screentime; and roughly 
15% of motion pictures exhibited in Mexico were domestically produced, more than two times the 
average during the 1930s [See Appendix].3 
 
From the 1940s until the early 1950s, Mexico had one of the most important film industries 
in the world, the leading film producer in the Spanish-speaking world. Beside María Félix and 
Fernando Fernández there were numerous Mexican stars-such as Dolores del Río, Jorge Negrete, 
Cantinflas  (Mario  Moreno),  Pedro  Armendáriz,  and  Pedro  Infante,  among  others-who  were 
extremely  popular  (and  often  worshipped)  throughout  the  Western  Hemisphere,  including  the 
United  States.  Mexican  films  were  exhibited  and  won  prizes  during  these  years  at  major 
international competitions such as Venice, Locarno, and Cannes.4  Nationally, the epoch remains a 
powerful contemporary force in popular culture and collective memory.5 Río Escondido might be 
one of the best internationally known Mexican films of the period, but what is more significant is 
that it was only one of many high-quality Mexican motion pictures, focusing on national subjects, 
produced and distributed by domestic companies during the so-called «Golden Age» of Mexican 
cinema, which climaxed in the mid and late 1940s.6 
 
President Alemán’s appearance in Río Escondido represented the key role of motion pictures 
in the state’s ideological project as well as the importance of the Mexican film industry as a symbol 
of national prestige and modernity. It was also emblematic of the broad interaction of the Mexican 
state  and film industry in  the 1940s.7 Alemán himself  oversaw the growth of  bureaucracies  to 
manage and stimulate  national  film production,  first  as  Secretary of  Gobernación,  head  of  the 
agency responsible for national mass-media policy, in the administration of his predecessor, Manuel 
Avila Camacho (1940-1946), and then, as we will see, as president himself (1946-1952). The state 
viewed Mexican films as a crucial  mass-cultural  dimension to national socialization.  It  utilized 
motion pictures as a means of political centralization and ideological dissemination. The Mexican 
government censored films, but the artistic initiative for feature motion pictures came from private 
sources. However, the state participated in a reciprocal informal relationship with leading domestic 
producers-subsidizing  motion  pictures  that  carried  propaganda  to  the  enlarged  domestic  film 
audience forged during World War II.8 
 
I
 
Like many other areas of Mexican industry, film expanded dramatically during World War 
II. This growth reflected an odd combination of factors: It was both a product of import-substitution 
development and of U.S.-led modernization. The lapse in wartime European film production and 
international distribution, combined with Hollywood’s reduced production of entertainment films, 
created  new  demand  for  Mexican  films  not  only  domestically  but  throughout  the  Western 
Hemisphere.9 Through projects  developed and administered  by the  Motion  Picture  Division  of 
Nelson Rockefeller’s wartime government agency, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter- American 
Affairs (OCIAA), the United States government multiplied the impact of wartime global economic 
and political conditions in advancing the growth of the Mexican film industry.  It undertook the 
modernization of Mexican film studios in order to develop a more authentic source of wartime 
propaganda  for  Latin  American  audiences.  In  addition,  the  United  States  allowed  raw  film-a 
commodity whose  production  it  controlled  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  and distributed  through 
wartime quotas-to  flow to  Mexico  and not  to  Argentina  (the  other  major  Latin  American  film 
producer) whose neutral attitude toward the Axis powers displeased U.S. policy makers.10 
 
On the surface, the Mexican wartime film industry seemed to have a bright future, but owing 
to a number of factors its situation as the war ended was very precarious. Because U.S. aid was 
invested in the production sector only, it helped create an industry with greatly expanded capacity, 
but extremely depended upon the favorable political and economic conditions created by the war for 
international  distribution  of  its  product.  Mexico’s  alliance  with  the  United  States,  the  drastic 
reduction in European imports to Latin America, and the ability of the U.S. state to restrain during 
wartime Hollywood producers who opposed assistance to the Mexican film industry all contributed 
in  creating  an artificial  environment  that  hid the  uneven development  of  Mexico’s  film sector. 
Postwar Mexican film producers lacked financial ability to import innovative producer goods and 
technical expertise available from the United States as well as the domestic and (especially) foreign 
distribution and exhibition networks necessary to most efficiently exploit  their  productions. But 
perhaps equally important, an industry that had benefited from the positive relations its government 
had with the United States during World War II found in the postwar period that that close interstate 
relationship generally, and the aid advanced Mexico’s film sector particularly, made it very difficult 
for the regime to adopt radically protectionist measures toward the dominant distributor of films in 
Mexico, Hollywood corporations. 
 
Toward the end of World War II, U .S. government -coordinated assistance to the Mexican 
film industry ended. As in others areas of wartime economic and technical aid with Latin American 
nations,  U.  S.  foreign  policy  toward  the  Mexican  film  industry  radically  changed  as  victory 
approached.11 Policies promising development were replaced by the realities of the marketplace. 
This shift in U.S. policy, in an industry whose wartime dependence on U .S. support cannot be 
overstated, had long-term ramifications for development of mass culture in Mexico.12 
 
Even  the  apparently  strong  production  sector  was  weak  in  ways  that  a  free-  market 
relationship  with  the  United  States  shortly  revealed.  Its  problems  ran  deeper  than  questions 
involving  the  distribution  and exhibition  of  movies  or  the  importation  of  new technology and 
producer  goods.  Capital  invested  in  Mexican  film production  was  mainly entrepreneurial.  This 
diffusion of capital, offset the expansion of the production plant and consumption market during the 
war. After the war, the organization of the Mexican industry was still much less integrated than the 
Hollywood corporations. Not only was production often segregated from distribution, and almost 
always from exhibition, but even production itself involved a multiplicity of producers each making 
on average only a handful of films a year.13 Further, the producers shared time at three or four 
studios of varying levels of technical capability. In short, where the U.S. industry was the ultimate 
in rationality, the Mexican, despite its aggregate wartime growth, was still extremely disorganized.
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These shortcomings were compounded by the fact that since the introduction of U.S. sound 
films in Mexico in the early 1930s, U.S. producers openly cooperated with each other in order to 
protect  their  common  interests.  The  Motion  Picture  Producers  and  Distributors  of  America 
(MPPDA),  led  by  former  Harding  administration  Postmaster  General  Will  Hays,  effectively 
coordinated and commanded diplomatic assistance from the State Department on behalf of the eight 
major U.S. feature-film exporters.15 This cooperative framework was reflected locally in Mexico 
where the major U.S. companies formed a Film Board composed of each firm’s local distribution 
manager, sometimes a Mexican but usually a North American, and collectively represented by a 
Mexican attorney, Enrique Zienert.16 
 
 
 
 
II
 
U.S. foreign policy in the mid 1940s, building upon the experiences of the war, recognized 
more than ever the important role of motion pictures in furthering state interests in the postwar 
world. In 1944, the State Department sent a film questionnaire to diplomatic posts worldwide, that 
differed from earlier such information gathering in that it combined commercial issues with broader 
political and economic ones.17 In making its case for diplomatic activism against nationalist media 
policies  in  foreign  nations,  the  MPPDA made  sure  that  the  State  Department  understood  the 
interaction between the market objectives of the major U.S. producers, the ideological goals of U.S. 
foreign  policy,  and  the  postwar  U.S.  political  economy’s  dependence  upon  exports  of  mass- 
produced consumer  goods.  In  October  1944,  Will  Hays  sent  Under  Secretary of  State  Edward 
Stettinius a memo outlining the rationale for «Government Co-operation in Maintaining Foreign 
Markets  for American Motion Pictures.» The MPPDA memo explained that  the motion-picture 
«industry is unique in exports» because 40% of its products goes abroad. «That so large a portion of 
industry  earnings  must  accrue  abroad,  renders  the  industry  peculiarly  susceptible  to  foreign 
governmental discrimination... inspired by interests competitive with United States pictures» .The 
memo explained that  since the U.S.  motion-picture  industry depended upon foreign revenue to 
cover  production  expenses,  the  quality  of  domestic  mass  culture  would  be  determined  by 
Hollywood’s ability to penetrate foreign markets: «The approximate forty percent of motion picture 
revenue which is foreign, is the margin by which supremacy of United States' pictures is financed 
and  maintained.  Bereft  of  these  revenues,  product  for  home  consumption  might  suffer 
proportionately».18 
 
The memo went on to offer several  interrelated arguments for undermining protectionist 
measures by other states in the interest  of U.S. foreign relations. These points ranged from the 
domestic economy of the United States to its international political position. Beyond its importance 
for national entertainment and communications, the MPPDA pointed out that, «the industry is a 
source of revenue in varying degree to the whole economic structure.» The memo claimed that 
approximately 250,000 people «derive their  living in the United States from the motion picture 
industry,» which paid a half billion dollars a year in taxes. It also listed over fifty commodities 
directly stimulated by motion picture production as well  as commercial  revenues in other mass 
media due to the vast advertising time and space bought by the studios.19 
 
Beyond  the  direct  economic  benefits  of  motion  picture  exports,  there  was  also  the 
importance of Hollywood exports as a means of disseminating values,  ideals, and consumption 
patterns crucial to the emerging U.S. political economy of the 1940s. The memo pointed out that: 
Just as our industry distributes its material largess with far-flung patronage of home industry, 
so do motion pictures carry to the world the story of United States products. It is inescapable 
that every entertainment picture is, secondarily, an alluring and dramatic demonstration of 
how  Americans  live  and  what  they  live  with.  It  is  not  necessary  to  make  deliberate 
presentation of these products for they appear inevitably on the screen. The newest styles, 
the latest customs, the most recent appliances are to be seen in use. The hundreds of millions 
of desires crystallized by motion pictures make hundreds of millions of customers at home 
and abroad for United States manufactures and purveyors.20 
 
Estimating that U.S. product controlled 80% of the world’s screentime, the MPPDA argued 
that Hollywood’s world hegemony represented the natural order of things, based upon the universal 
appeal of the images, values, and sentiments represented in U.S. motion pictures: «These are the 
imperishable things of which pictures are made. And they are the same the world over. Geography 
leaves them untouched. They are the common ground of all men everywhere.»21 It offered support 
for the internationalist justification for U .S. world hegemony emerging during World War II,22 at 
the same time providing an economic and political  rationale for U .S. foreign policy to stymie 
attempts by other nations to develop their motion-picture industries at the expense of Hollywood’s 
control: 
As  the  most  universal  part  of  international  communications,  motion  pictures  present 
effortlessly and entertainingly the United States message to an interested world. A world so 
interested,  be  it  remembered,  that  it  pays  a  price  of  admission  to  see  and  hear.  The 
government has a high purpose in keeping such a medium free, that it may never lose the 
public  trust.  It  has  equal  interest  in  protecting  the  right  of  the  industry  to  earn  ample 
finances, that it may always be ready, able willing to perform in greater degree than any 
competitive agency of foreign registry can perform.23 
 
There was a special imperative to promote U .S. motion pictures in Latin America where 
U.S. foreign relations had been, according to the MPPDA, «immeasurably fostered by the showing 
of documentary and entertainment films.» The memo emphasized that, «it is ardently to be desired 
that the power of the film in all its forms should be preserved to the people of the United States, not 
surrendered to non- hemispheric productions.»24 Yet despite this warning of possible «European 
blandishment,» the real threat to Hollywood’s control of Latin American movie screens was not 
from a  «non-hemispheric»  world  rival  to  U.S.  power,  but,  as  we will  see,  from a  third-world 
neighbor, Mexico. 
 
Finally,  the  MPPDA,  after  pointing  out  the  special  threats  posed  by British  and Soviet 
motion pictures to Hollywood’s domestic and international (especially Latin American) position, 
made clear what they expected from U.S. foreign policy in opposing the development of foreign 
film industries through nationalist policies: 
Any degree of subsidy by foreign government of foreign industry for purposes of competing 
with United States industry thus appears quite properly a matter for our government’s active 
interest. The imposition of discriminatory taxes, restrictive orders, quotas and regulations in 
limitation of United States' distribution, are matters clearly within the indicated sphere of 
our government’s inquiry and action.25  
Although  the  MPPDA stressed  the  inherent  superiority  of  Hollywood  films,  it  was  not 
willing to risk the development of competitive producers in other nations. 
 
The convergence of Hollywood and U.S. foreign-policy objectives served the expansion of 
U.S. culture abroad. But it had particular significance for Latin America. The importance of Latin 
America  for  Hollywood grew during  World  War  II,  as  European and Asian  markets  were  less 
accessible to North American product, at the same time the Mexican film industry was expanding 
its  domestic production and hemispheric exports.  As the war ended,  the nature of Hollywood's 
collaboration  with  U.S.  foreign  policy  metamorphosed.  World  War  n  had  transformed  foreign 
policy’s primary relationship to U.S. mass-culture industries from that of commercial representation 
to  coordinating  ideological  programs-exemplified  by the  work  of  the  OCIAA’s  Motion  Picture 
Division.26 While the end of the war induced Hollywood to reemphasize its commercial agenda 
with  the  State  Department  it  was  now irreversibly integrated  into  the  international  propaganda 
programs of postwar U.S. foreign policy. Each reinforced the other.27 
The Hollywood-based public corporation established by the OCIAA and administered by top 
industry  executives  to  coordinate  Latin  American  activities  of  the  studios  (including  the 
modernization of the Mexican film industry)-the Motion Picture Society for the Americas (MPSA)-
demonstrated this  alteration.28 In formulating its postwar mission,  the Society explained clearly 
how objectives Hollywood’s dovetailed with the goals of U.S. foreign policy: 
An opportunity of historic proportions is now offered to our industry .The power of this 
great medium will be manifest not alone in money but in ideological influence over nations. 
Both the President of the United States and the State Department have publicly proclaimed 
the  motion  picture  as  the  medium  which  can  stabilize  and  insure  two-way  friendship. 
Needless to say, the Latin America area is a vital consideration for the industry on behalf of 
the people of the United States. 
 
Beyond  pointing  out  that  Latin  America  was  the  key  to  U.S.  defense,  with  Mexico 
representing a crucial position, these industry leaders emphasized the unequal but interdependent 
nature  of  the  economies  of  the  United  States  and  Latin  America  in  maintaining  the  political 
economy of the United States by finding markets for consumer goods, raw materials for industrial 
production, and investments for U.S. capital. The executives noted that: 
The industrial development of the other American republics should exceed any other area of 
the world. ...It has been estimated that in the decade following the war, Latin America will 
need U.S.$ 9,000,000,000 worth of heavy machinery. The United States [is] a market for 
Latin  American  raw materials  in  the  post-war  period  due  to  the  depletion  of  our  own 
reserves. This means more buying power in the Latin American countries, which builds a 
market  for  American  export  product.  From  the  business  standpoint,  the  Latin  America 
market is the fastest expanding area in the world. Spot checks of motion picture progress in 
the  various  countries  of  Latin  America  are  already  beginning  to  reveal  the  enormous 
potential of this great area. 
Echoing the MPPDA’s warnings, the Society emphasized that «under the guise of cultural 
activities,» England, France, and Britain would actively promote their revived film industries in the 
«other Americas» after World War II.29 
 
The above statement accurately describes the basis of the collaboration of Hollywood and 
the State Department. The industrialization of Latin American nations during the Depression and 
World War II, combined with the wartime acceleration of Mexican film production, had expanded 
the demand for motion picture throughout the hemisphere. As the producer of a major international 
commodity, Hollywood- organized in the MPPDA-historically had strong support from the State 
Department. The interests of the government complimented and supplemented the interests of the 
studios. U.S. foreign policy makers saw Hollywood films as crucial to the ideological and cultural 
influence of the United States throughout the Western Hemisphere and to the broader reinforcement 
of the interamerican economic relationships crucial to the political economy of the United States. 
As  Will  Hays  put  it  in  justifying  his  request  for  a  State  Department  assault  on  new Mexican 
attempts at regulating motion-picture exhibition in 1944, he did so «merely out of a desire to further 
the development of the cooperative program in which we are both so interested.»30 
 
The increasingly Hollywood-friendly attitude of U.S. foreign policy in the 1940s, generated 
State  Department  sensitivity  to  the  dilemma  posed  by  Mexican  film  production  for  the  U.S. 
industry. The U.S. embassy expert on the Mexican motion-picture industry noted in 1944 the impact 
of the wartime growth in Mexican film production on that industry's distribution needs: «One of the 
results of this rapid development of the motion-picture industry here has been the production of a 
larger number of films and a natural desire to find the Mexican outlets for the exhibition of these 
films.» Ultimately, though, U.S. diplomats were confident that Hollywood’s dominant position in 
Mexico was secure,  owing to the dependence of Mexican producers on exports  of films to the 
Spanish-speaking  United  States,  Mexico’s  most  easily  reached  and  largest  realized  market.  If 
Mexico attempted to limit the distribution of U.S. films in order to develop its industry’s domestic 
market «it would eventually lead to retaliation in the United States against Mexican pictures. In 
view  of  this  situation  the  Mexican  Government  might  be  willing  to  enter  into  some  overall 
agreement  for  protecting  the  rights  of  American  distributors  in  Mexico  and the  distribution  of 
Mexican  pictures  in  the  United  States.»31 The  containment  of  the  Mexican  film  industry’s 
development  through  diplomatic  insistence  on  free-trade  became  the  dominant  feature  of 
Hollywood's and the U.S. government's film policy towards Mexico. 
 
Even before World War II ended, Mexican producers recognized their dependency on U.S.  
foreign policy and the pending threat  of increasingly intense postwar competition at  home and 
abroad from Hollywood. In reviewing the situation of the Mexican film industry at the outset of 
1945,  the  leading  editorialist  of  El  Cine  Gráfico,  the  Mexican  film industry’s  most  important 
business publication, pointed out to his colleagues that the Mexican industry was at a crossroads: To 
secure long -term growth and development it  would have to resist  the temptation of sacrificing 
quality for short-term profits. Instead of using Mexico’s expanded plant to imitate Hollywood films, 
the industry should aim for distinctively Mexican pictures, of high technical and artistic quality, that 
would carve out a  special  niche not only in  Mexico but also in the world’s  immense Spanish- 
speaking film markets.32 
 
This was a timely strategy, for the U.S. motion-picture industry was planning to contain and 
diminish Mexican production as the war entered its final phase. No longer controlled by the need of 
the  state-directed  U  .S.  war  complex  to  coordinate  mass  culture  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
Hollywood,  working together  with the State  Department,  began to  reorganize itself  in  order  to 
dominate Latin American movie screens.  Its  major competition for control of Spanish-speaking 
audiences was the Mexican industry.  In 1944, the State Department  official  responsible for the 
interests of Hollywood articulated for his superiors the problems presented by the Mexican industry 
for U.S. distributors in Latin America: «The leaders of the American film industry are increasingly 
disturbed over the inroads being made into their Latin American business by Mexican films and 
they attribute  this  almost  entirely  to  OCIAA’s efforts  in  behalf  of  the  Mexican  industry.»33 In 
appealing for the support of the State Department, Hollywood made it clear that since U.S. actions 
had helped Mexico take advantage of the market opportunities presented by World War II, U.S. 
producers now expected their government to return to its traditional relationship with U.S. motion 
picture distributors operating in Latin America: facilitating the hegemony of U.S. motion-pictures 
throughout the Western Hemisphere as a promoter of broader U.S. economic and political goals as 
well as providing a service to a major North American export industry . 
 
 
III
 
Like the U.S. film industry, Mexico’s depended upon exports. This was particularly acute 
given  the  wartime  growth  of  Mexico’s  film  production  due  to  the  indirect  and  direct  factors 
mentioned above. With the postwar resumption of full-scale Hollywood production and the end of 
U.S. government assistance, Mexico required foreign markets not simply in order to grow but to 
survive. Moreover, despite the wartime growth in Mexico’s film sector, the United States continued 
to dominate Mexican exhibition [See Appendix]. Hence, the development of foreign film markets 
was crucial to Mexico’s ability to continue to take national control of its domestic mass culture. 
 
Mexican  film  was  an  unusual  Latin  American  export  commodity  in  that  it  was  a 
manufactured  good.  It  was  unique  also  in  terms  of  the  traditional  patterns  of  U.S.  -  Mexican 
economic interaction in that it  was a commodity that flowed both ways in significant quantities 
across the Río Bravo. This two-way media flow reflected the cultural web that bound the historical 
development of the United States and Mexico,  in this  case:  the long-standing presence of U.S. 
movies in the Mexican market (preceding the development of Mexico’s own sound film industry) 
and  the  large  Hispanic,  especially  Chicano/a,  populations  in  the  United  States  that  demanded 
Mexican motion pictures. 
Beyond the importance of foreign markets  for Mexico’s domestic film industry,  motion-
picture  exports  benefited  key international  interests  of  the  state.  They were  a  major  source  of 
foreign exchange-crucial for Mexico’s balance of payments. Further, foreign exhibition of Mexican 
motion-pictures promoted trade, investment, tourism, and hemispheric political influence. For these 
reasons a Mexican Council of Foreign Commerce study argued for the «necessity of encouraging 
and coordinating, through the State or with its intervention, the activities of the film industry in 
Mexico, and of fixing the standards of quality which are necessary to the prestige and the economic 
standing of the country.» The state viewed foreign film markets as integral to Mexican postwar 
national  development  and international  relations.  The  survival  and  growth  of  a  major  national 
industry would allow for the sovereign control of Mexican mass culture.34 
 
Mexican motion-picture producers viewed Latin America as their  backyard.  Mexico had 
developed mass audiences throughout the region during World War II. Streamlining hemispheric 
distribution  and increasing  its  share  of  Latin  American  screentime  was  a  primary objective  of 
postwar Mexican media planners. Although the United States produced the single highest average 
gross for Mexican films, the combined national markets of the Western Hemisphere far exceeded it, 
and in Spanish- speaking nations Mexican film imports appealed to national mass audiences, unlike 
their  exports  to  the  United  States  which  (rarely  subtitled)  were  limited  to  regional  markets.35 
Moreover, by the end of World War II, no other Latin American nation had a domestic film sector 
that could compete with Mexican exports in an open market. 
 
In  the  long-run,  despite  the  dominance  of  U.S.  motion  pictures  throughout  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  Mexican films held obvious cultural  advantages  in competing with Hollywood.  In 
Latin  American nations,  unlike the European market,  cultural  factors  could counter-balance the 
economic  and  political  advantages  held  by  postwar  Hollywood.  Yet  despite  such  advantages, 
Mexico  faced  serious  direct  and  indirect  problems  generated  by  Hollywood  and  the  U  .S. 
government. Because U.S. films often accumulated profits or at least covered their costs in the U.S. 
market, Mexican officials complained it was «possible for them to sell their pictures at a low price 
abroad or to sustain losses.» Particularly in Latin America (politically weaker than, for example, 
Western Europe during the cold war), Hollywood took advantage of U.S. diplomatic demands for a 
postwar mass-media free market that made it difficult to develop audiences for Mexican films.36 
 
U .S. control of film stock also curtailed Mexican production at a critical juncture in the 
Mexican  film industry’s  development.  In  early  1944,  the  OCIAA’s  representative  in  charge  of 
overseeing aid to the Mexican film industry, Frank Fouce, «estimated that there are approximately 
twenty or twenty-five million pesos that were frozen in completed pictures which producers have 
been  unable  to  exploit  or  exhibit,  due  to  the  shortages  of  raw  film  for  release  prints.»31 He 
estimated that Mexico was capable of producing 126 films a year if its raw stock requirements were 
met.  (In fact  Mexico never  distributed more than 67 during the war).38 In an overview of  the 
Mexican  industry’s  situation,  Fouce  concluded that,  «shortage  of  raw film continues  to  be the 
paramount  problem for  all  producers.»39 Fouce  warned  leaders  in  the  Mexican  industry,  who 
controlled the distribution of U.S.-supplied raw film in Mexico, to limit their production schedules 
and to discourage the entry of new producers (ones who also would have been less integrated into 
the developing U.S. system in Mexico) into the motion-picture sector: «The mad scramble for raw 
film must cease and cease immediately, restrictions must be placed upon new producers and the 
infiltration of new capital, and you must also exercise a control on the number of pictures that each 
producer  contemplates  within  his  production  schedule  for  the  year.»40 Fouce  urged  the  U.S. 
government  to  increase its  raw film allocation to  Mexico for 1944 by 10,000,000 feet.  But  he 
warned that full production needs could not be met in Mexico, because its film sector lacked the 
necessary exhibition and distribution facilities to exploit its expanded production. Fully meeting 
Mexican  requests  for  virgin  film  would  generate  animosity  towards  U.S.  policies  that  had 
contributed to the Mexican film sector's uneven wartime development, as backlogs caused financial 
problems  for  Mexican  producers-especially  when  the  war  ended  and  full-force  Hollywood 
competition resumed. 41 One way Mexican producers found greater access to wartime film supplies 
as well as distribution and production facilities was through collaboration with Hollywood concerns 
-such as Columbia Pictures- which used U.S. supplied Mexican stock to produce prints of Mexican 
films for distribution through its Latin American organization.42 
 
As the war  ended,  El Cine Gráfico complained  about  the  increasing  difficulty Mexican 
producers had in obtaining raw film stock from the United States, rhetorically pondering why it was 
that the United States preferred to supply «sufficient film to Russia, India and England, but not to 
Mexico, the good, but poor and weak, neighbor to the south.»43 By 1947, the situation was critical, 
a Mexican government study reported that «the quota of unexposed film assigned by the United 
States government during the past war, continues to be insufficient for [our] already limited national 
film production needs.»44 Without freer access to this essential producer good, Mexico could not 
take advantage of the growing Latin American demand for prints of its feature films. 
 
IV
 
The question of domestic and international demand for Mexican films is an important and 
complicated one involving regional,  class,  ethnic,  and national  factors.  Nonetheless,  the overall 
statistical and impressionistic evidence allows for drawing a conclusively comprehensive portrait, 
depicting  the  high  popularity  of  Mexican  films  throughout  the  Spanish-speaking  Western 
Hemisphere: Mexican motion pictures were more popular than their major competition, Hollywood 
films.45 
 
The Mexican film industry’s most important market was its domestic audience. After World 
War II,  the industry's  increasing number of higher-quality films -reflecting its  maturation- were 
more popular than U.S. motion-pictures. In 1947, the U.S. consulate in Monterrey observed that, 
«distributors report that the income for good Mexican films is approximately 20 percent greater 
than that for U.S. films. The increase in production and improvements in Mexican films, especially 
those starring the leading Mexican stars, are beginning to make them more popular than United 
States films.»46 A year later, the U.S. embassy noted that «good Mexican films are preferred to any 
foreign films.» Especially popular were «typically Mexican pictures. These films are the ‘Westerns’ 
of Mexico. Heavy melodrama, romance, and tear-jerkers.»47 In 1949, the Embassy reported that, 
«despite the predominant position of the United States in respect to the number of features shown, 
Mexicans absorbed a high percentage of the total number of exhibition hours.» In Mexico City, 
where  foreign  films  were  more  popular  than  in  any  other  area  of  the  nation,  Mexican  films 
controlled 42.44 % of exhibition time in 1946, 41.2% in 1947, and 41.8% for the first half  of 
1948.48 
 Postwar trends among Mexican audiences existed in other Latin American nations. In Cuba, 
arguably the Latin American nation most economically and culturally linked to the United States, 
the U.S. embassy reported that: «Artistically and technically Mexican movies are not comparable 
with United States and European pictures. However, Mexican movies have been able to portray the 
national spirit, institutions, character, and social organism of Mexico, which to a large degree are 
similar  to  those in  Cuba.»  In fact,  except  for  Hollywood productions  that  featured «fast-paced 
action», the kind of expensive spectacles beyond the production capacities of the rest of the world’s 
film industries, Cuban «film distributors and theater owners say that Mexican movies are more 
popular [than Hollywood’s] in Cuba outside of Habana and Santiago. » The high quality of postwar 
Mexican films and their reflection of Latin American themes and genres made them popular not 
only in the provinces but also in large cities, where «more than a dozen distributors,  including 
branches of United States studios, unanimously agree that Mexican films hold a unique, high place 
in the affections of the representative Cuban theatergoer.» Even Hollywood action films were less 
popular than Mexican films when they took place in locales unfamiliar to urban Cuban audiences. 
The popularity of Mexican films transcended the fact that they were in Spanish. Not «having to read 
Spanish sub-titles of English-language movies, is an important but not the fundamental reason for 
the partiality shown Mexican films.» The report pointed out that, «films produced in Argentina and 
Spain are in Spanish, yet their popularity outside of Habana is no greater than United States, Italian, 
and French films.»49 
 
In the late 1940s, Spanish-speaking populations throughout the Americas chose high-quality 
Mexican  productions  over  Hollywood’s,  as  long  as  the  supply  satisfied  the  demand  for 
entertainment. In the Spanish-speaking Americas, Mexican films, with few exceptions, were second 
behind  the  United  States  as  far  as  the  number  of  titles  released-exporting  almost  its  entire 
production  to  each  nation  of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  sometimes  exceeding  40% of  the  films 
shown in a given country, surpassing Hollywood’s distribution in certain Latin American markets, 
such as Venezuela. Moreover, despite the larger number of U.S. films distributed in Latin America, 
Mexican  films  played  longer  and  on  more  screens  than  U.S.  films.  As  in  Mexico,  they  were 
especially  popular  with  working  class,  provincial,  and  mestizo  audiences  as  opposed to  upper 
middle and upper class urban audiences. In part this reflected trends in literacy, since most U.S.  
films were subtitled. Yet it also represented the more national, or less international, perspective of 
the lower classes. 
 
However, as Mexican films improved, they threatened to cut into Hollywood’s control of 
middle-class  audiences  as  well.  The  U.S.  commercial  attaché  in  Lima  noted,  «the  advantage 
enjoyed by pictures with Spanish dialog [sic] ...remains important, particularly in theaters catering 
to the less educated components of the population. An improvement in the quality of such pictures 
would immediately enhance their competitive position.»50 The most popular Mexican films were 
comedies  and  musicals,  films  that  had  Latin  American  contexts  not  present  in  Hollywood 
productions.  By  contrast,  the  most  popular  Hollywood  films  were  ones  that  represented 
distinctively  North  American  genres  such  as  gangster  pictures,  romance  films  featuring  North 
American images of beauty and sexuality, and high-budget spectacles. 
In Chile, the U.S. embassy observed that Mexican «films offer competition to United States 
films  because  of  their  greater  acceptance  outside  of  the  larger  cities.»  Even  in  larger  cities, 
Hollywood «films are well received but in general do not enjoy any preference over other foreign-
produced films.»51 The U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce reported that, «the recent 
improvement in the quality of Mexican films and the importation thereof on a larger scale has 
‘blown the lid’ off of Nicaraguan box office receipts with individual pictures out-grossing even the 
best  United  States  films.»  And the  immediate  outlook for  Hollywood was bleak:  «One theater 
chain,» according to the U.S. commercial attaché in Managua, «has agreed to exhibit 109 Mexican 
pictures as compared with a tentative schedule of approximately 165 United States films» in 1947. 
A major cause for this region-wide surge was that, «Mexican films more clearly depict the Latin 
American point of view.»52 In Venezuela, where the percentage of Mexican films shown in 1948 
exceeded that of U.S. movies, trade representatives observed that «Mexican films are preferred to 
all other films and it is believed that they would enjoy an even greater share of the market if more 
films could be supplied. »53 In Peru, local distributors of U.S. films imported on average two or 
three prints «of the more popular films.» While «distributors of Mexican motion pictures frequently 
import  10  or  more  prints  for  simultaneous  release  in  several  theaters.»54 In  El  Salvador,  U.S. 
diplomats reported that not only had the popularity of Mexican films increased in recent years but 
also «that Mexican films are given preferential treatment by the distribution monopoly.»55 
 
The increased and more advanced production of Mexican films during World War II had 
allowed for the postwar expansion of exports. The U.S. commercial attaché in Colombia concluded, 
«the enormous improvement in the technique of Mexican features» allowed for the Mexican film 
industry to take advantage of its linguistic and cultural advantages. It dwarfed the crippled postwar 
Argentine  film  industry’s  regional  exports,  which  in  Colombia  were  four  times  smaller  than 
Mexico’s.56 
 
The evidence is clear, in the postwar 1940s the Mexican film industry had great potential to 
become the leading exporter of film to Latin America –crucial to its ability to maintain itself as a 
dominant  domestic  mass  medium.  Yet  despite  this  greater  popular  demand  and  in  some cases 
official support for Mexican motion pictures in Latin America, the market for Mexican product was 
limited by a concerted use of tactics collectively engaged by the major studios. Principally, they 
controlled  independent  theater  owners-at  home  and  abroad-through  the  business  technique  of 
«block booking.» In order to obtain a company’s best films, a studio required exhibitors to take an 
entire package of films, the bulk of which were mediocre but tied up the theater’s screentime. In 
Peru, for instance, official U .S. observers noted that despite the inroads being made by postwar 
Mexican exports, the United States still held decisive advantages. In terms of demand, «such factors 
as outstanding direction and production techniques» as well  as «steady and ample supplies» of 
films,  something  the  Mexican  industry  could  not  meet,  countered  the  growing  popularity  of 
Mexican productions. But more decisively, as far as exhibition, the «special arrangements for the 
release  of  pictures  in  theaters  owned  or  controlled  by  distributors  also  favor  United  States 
productions.».57 When  combined  with  U.S.  diplomatic  pressure  for  mass-media  free  trade, 
increasing  difficulty  for  Mexican  producers  to  obtain  raw  stock  to  meet  market  demand, 
Hollywood’s international business tactics made it very difficult for Mexican producers to expand 
their exports. 
 
V
 
The controversy that developed between Mexico and the United States over postwar foreign 
film distribution in Spain, offers an example of how Hollywood and the State Department interacted 
in reducing Mexico’s ability to expand its foreign motion- picture distribution. It also demonstrates 
the unfortunate relationship between Mexico's need to develop new markets for its postwar film 
industry and its decisive short-term dependence on its U.S. Spanish-speaking markets. 
 
By 1945, U.S. international trade policies were no longer shaped by official, liberal, U.S. 
war time ideology. The United States took advantage of its emerging world economic hegemony to 
expand its  markets  and  political  power regardless  of  the  illiberal  political  orientations  of  non-
communist governments. The new international satan would now be on the left. Where communism 
was  not  a  factor,  the  main  threat  to  U.S.  media  policy was  economic  not  political.  The  State 
Department challenged nationalist media regulation and protection and, especially, policies that did 
not favor Hollywood’s position among foreign film producers. 
 
As  the  war  ended  Spain's  film  industry  became  more  dependent  on  U  .S.  policies, 
nonetheless  the  Franco  government  tried  to  further  the  development  of  private-sector  motion-
picture production through state intervention. Just as Mexico viewed Spanish- speaking audiences 
in  the  Americas  and  Spain  as  crucial  markets,  the  Spanish  government,  according  to  U.S. 
Ambassador Norman Armour, held «the conviction that [it] should have a motion picture industry 
capable of producing films which can find ready markets in the countries of Latin America» as well 
as  the  U  .S.  and  European  nations  with  which  it  «has  historical,  cultural  and  blood  ties.» 
Domestically,  the  Spanish  government  desired  a  national  film  industry  that  should  serve 
«educational  as  well  as  entertainment»  functions.  Spanish  officials  estimated  that  with  state 
support-including the imposition of film quotas and exchange controls on foreign motion-picture 
distributors-Spain could produce 70 films in 1946leaving about 150 for foreign imports. Armour 
noted  that,  «The  American  industry  has  complained  against  the  measures  which  the  Spanish 
government has taken to fortify its economic and exchange position or which have been used to 
protect and foster a domestic industry which Spain wishes to develop.» He concluded that, «The 
position of American films in Spain may become progressively worse unless some device is found 
to arrest the strong nationalistic trend,» since «the Embassy's protests and exhortations have been 
unavailing.»58 
 
Ambassador  Armour  confronted  directly the  increasingly nationalist  film policies  of  the 
Franco government by exploiting Spain’s desperate need for virgin film, a commodity in short 
supply in war-ravaged Europe. In April 1945, he reported to the State Department that: «It will be 
possible only to use raw stock as a bargaining power during the perhaps short period of scarcity and 
control and its value will be lost, therefore, unless used now. There is always the possibility that 
Spain may try to obtain raw stock relief from other supply countries.»59 Armour pointed out to 
Spanish officials that Hollywood’s market objectives in Spain would have to be satisfied «before 
the United States can be expected to view sympathetically the problems which are resulting from 
short age of raw stock.»60 As negotiations over the postwar Spanish market intensified in the last 
quarter  of  1945,  Assistant  Secretary of  State  for  economic  affairs,  William Clayton,  instructed 
Ambassador Armour that:  «In view of the present film negotiations  underway at...  Madrid,  the 
Department believes that the American position... would be jeopardized by the release at this time 
of raw film shipments.» He suggested that the Spanish government be advised that resolution of the 
«American  motion  picture  situation»  in  Spain  would  «find  this  Government  receptive  to 
suggestions for the resumption of raw stock shipments.»61 only to State Department media officials 
but also to Carl Milliken, Foreign Director of the MPPDA, Armour reported that, «It is suggested 
that  270  foreign  films  are  required  annually  to  service  Spanish  theatres  adequately  and  that 
American films should constitute not less that two-thirds or 180 of this number.» In addition, to 
establishing this quota, the United States sought other measures which would insure that «American 
films [were] accorded equality of treatment in all respects with films of Spanish origin. »62 Three 
days  later,  the  U.S.  embassy  reported  an  agreement  that  achieved  all  of  the  MPPDA’s  goals 
including the principal issue: «the number of films to be imported.»63 
 
Under its final agreement with Spain, the MPPDA obtained two-thirds of the, 1946 Spanish 
foreign film quota for U.S. product, or 120 of the 180 films Spain allowed to be imported that year. 
The main reason Hollywood was able to gain this over whelming market share was that the Spanish 
film industry, like the Mexican, was dependent upon U.S. government-controlled supplies of raw 
stock in order to produce motion pictures. 
 
Mexico protested the advantageous position Hollywood carved out for itself in Spain. As in 
other  nations,  the  MPPDA and  the  State  Department  had  worked  hand-in-  hand  in  Spain  to 
negotiate an agreement  that  violated long-established U.S.  principles about  free trade and open 
markets. Mexican producers considered Spain a natural market for their product, and an important 
gateway to potential markets in the rest of Europe. Mexican diplomats accused the United States of 
taking advantage of its control of a primary resource in the negotiations between the MPPDA and 
the Spanish government over the film quota. They also felt that the United States unfairly benefited 
from the lack of Mexican diplomatic relations with Spain, which had dissolved with the rise of 
Franco  in  the  1930s.  The  representative  of  the  Association  of  Mexican  Film  Producers  and 
Distributors complained to the State Department that the U .S. agreement with Spain left Mexico, 
Britain,  France,  Argentina,  and  Italy  (the  five  major  sources,  aside  from the  United  States,  of 
imported films to Spain) to «divide, arbitrarily, the balance of 60 full length pictures as remaining, 
after the agreement signed by the Spanish government and the representative of the Will H. Hays 
Committee [MPPDA]. That would mean, if divided equally, that Mexico would be limited to the 
exportation of 12 full length pictures for the coming year.»64 
 
U.S. embassy officials who monitored the Mexican industry recognized that the postwar 
dependence  of  Mexican  producers  on  Spanish-speaking  U.S.  markets,  meant  that  Mexico’s 
bargaining power was small. Although the potential for Mexican film markets in other areas of the 
Spanish-speaking  world  was  certainly greater  than  those  existing  in  the  United  States.  Mexico 
lacked the distribution networks and lucrative audiences already established in its  U.S.  market, 
which represented its  single  largest  foreign audience.  The U.S.  embassy expert  on the motion-
picture industry pointed out that «the market in the United States for Mexican pictures is many 
times greater than the Spanish market for Mexican films.» concluding «that the American market 
will continue to be much more important than any Spanish market which could be developed.» He 
noted that Mexican producers were very aware of their dependence on the U.S. market. Since the 
United States did not impose any restrictions on imported Mexican films, it  was understood by 
them that North American producers expected, and their government would insist upon, reciprocity. 
It was, therefore, virtually impossible for Mexico to contemplate enacting film quotas in retaliation 
for the Spanish situation, unless it risk similar measures by the United States which would mean 
disaster for its film sector.65
 
By  1946,  Hollywood  boasted  that:  «The  popularity  of  American  pictures  in  Spain  is 
unchallenged.  Currently,  80  per  cent  of  the  pictures  shown there  are  American...  The  Spanish 
exhibitor,  who  must  work  hard  at  selling  even  his  native  productions,  finds  selling  American 
pictures easy.»66 Despite significant popular demand for Mexican films, in 1946 Mexico exported 
only  29  films  to  Spain,  in  1947  only  22-  about  one-third  and  one-fourth,  respectively,  of  its 
production in each of these years.67 
 
The above episode was a significant precursor of U.S.-Mexican film relations during the 
postwar 1940s in two ways: First, the United States divorced its foreign trade principles-expressed 
in  its  rhetoric  of  open  markets-from  the  dealings  of  the  MPPDA around  the  world,  which 
undermined the competitiveness of the global culture market, with devastating consequences for a 
developing producer nation like Mexico. Second, the State Department used access to U.S. Spanish-
speaking markets and control of raw film stock as leverage to contain the Mexican industry. 
 
VI
 
Due to the combination of Hollywood’s business practices and the diplomatic support of the 
United States in Spanish-speaking nations, Mexican film exports lost ground in the postwar world 
market. In evaluating the condition of the national film industry’s export potential at the outset of 
1948, El Cine Gráfico lamented that «Mexican cinema had been in the position of possessing all the 
world’s  markets»  but  now found  foreign  distributors  wary  of  the  quality  of  many films.  The 
inability to expand exports and organize itself domestically was damaging the quality of Mexican 
productions and the film sector’s general standing.68 
 
By the late 1940s,  Mexican media planners worried not only about the difficult  task of 
promoting  exports  but  also  about  protecting  their  domestic  motion-picture  market  from  U.S. 
domination. They lamented the fact that «there is no legislation in our country which limits the 
importation of foreign films and enables the Mexican industry to face the sharp competition which 
exists.» Despite postwar proposals to require domestic exhibitors to reserve 50% of their screen 
time for national product, no such radical protection was successful instituted. Instead government 
film experts consulting with leading producers recommended a combination of state promotion of 
the  film  sector  (including  moderate  protection  and  much  needed  credit)  and  the  continued 
aggressive pursuit of foreign markets.69
 
Having failed to find significant new foreign markets or to erect meaningful import controls 
of Hollywood product, the regime responded to the disintegrating tendencies in the film sector by 
increasing its organization and coordination of all facets of the industry. Between 1948 and 1950, 
the Mexican state undertook measures aimed at developing its national film sector: it  enacted a 
comprehensive Ley de Cinematografía, creating a tripartite Comisión Nacional de Cinematografía 
(including  representatives  of  labor,  government,  and  capital);  took  over  the  operation  of  the 
previously privately managed Banco Cinematográfico; built state-owned theaters to draw Mexican 
productions; organized an international distribution company aimed at Latin America; created the 
Dirección General de Cinematografía in the Secretaría de Gobernación (which regulated domestic 
political administration as the most important state ministry ) as coordinator of all motion-picture 
activity in Mexico.70 
 
Bureaucratic  innovation  did  not  end  the  dependence  of  Mexican  producers  on  the  U.S. 
market, given their inability to break the U.S. hold on most of the world’s movie screens (let alone 
Mexico’s). The state soon attempted to utilize these new tools by initiating protective regulation-
involving  taxation  and quotas-aimed at  increasing  Mexico’s  share  of  its  national  market.  State 
measures designed to compensate for the political and economic advantages held by Hollywood in 
the  Mexican  market  provoked determined U.S.  opposition.  The  State  Department  led  the  way. 
Invoking the rhetoric of the «Open Door,» it insisted upon Mexican reciprocity for the accessibility 
of Spanish-speaking U.S. markets-even as it threatened the survival of a major national industry and 
the cultural sovereignty of its World War II ally and emerging cold-war partner. Mexico, though, 
demonstrated its ability to resist complete U.S. mass- media domination. One case-relating to taxes-
is considered below. 
  
During 1948 and 1949, the Mexican state began to address the limitations on Mexican film 
production imposed by the position of the United States in the Mexican motion-picture market with 
a variety of moderately protectionist measures. Among the most troublesome new regulations for 
Hollywood was the imposition of taxes on the distribution of foreign films-which meant mainly 
U.S.  productions.  In  fact,  Mexico  was  not  so  much  imposing  new taxes  as  it  was  exempting 
domestic  distributors  from a  long-standing  5%  tax  on  gross  receipts  of  film  exhibition.  This 
exemption supported the national industry in two ways: It reduced the relative profitability of the 
Mexican market for Hollywood, protecting domestic production. And the revenue was to be used to 
finance  promotional  policies  on  behalf  of  domestic  motion-picture  producers  that  they  had 
previously paid out of their own receipts. By taxing exhibition rather than imports, Mexico formally 
circumvented its  1942 reciprocal  trade agreement with the United States.  This new exemption-
combined with a separate new 3% tax on film distribution, that also exempted domestic product, 
and a  drastic  increase in censorship fees-panicked U.S.  distributors  who convinced the leading 
embassy  analyst  of  the  film industry  that  the  «series  of  discriminatory  burdens  borne  by  our 
industry  are  rapidly  making  the  distribution  of  American  motion  pictures  in  this  country 
impossible.»71 The  film industry’s  local  representative,  Enrique  Zienert,  warned «that  only the 
strongest diplomatic pressure will bring the companies any relief.»72 
 
The argument put forth by the State Department on behalf of the MPPDA was that the new 
regulation violated the spirit if not the actual stipulations of sections of the 1942 Trade Agreement 
covering motion pictures. It was pessimistic that it  could use the agreement to force Mexico to 
revise radically its new policies, which were technically legal. It did feel that political pressure and 
threats of retaliation could force Mexico to back down, keeping its movie screens open-except for 
very  modest  regulations-to  U.S.  films.73 Nonetheless,  some  Hollywood  and  State  Department 
officials feared the threat of a nationalist reaction to overtly coercive efforts. 
 
Unfortunately for Mexico,  its  new policies coincided with yet  another  crisis  for its  film 
industry.  The U.S.  Internal  Revenue Service (IRS),  responding to  an unrelated recent  Supreme 
Court  decision,  reevaluated  its  tax  policies  toward  the  two  U.S.  companies,  Azteca  and  Clasa 
Mohme, that distributed Mexican films in the United States. Although, apparently an independent 
matter, the IRS decision to tax (retroactive to 1936) the exhibition of Mexican motion pictures at the 
rate of 31% on rents  and royalties became intertwined with U  .S.  efforts  to  eliminate  the new 
Mexican protectionist taxes. 
 
 
Leaders of the Mexican industry lobbied the ruling regime, pointing out that Mexican films 
on average only covered 40% of their costs in the domestic market, relying on exports for the other 
60%. By contrast, they argued, Hollywood was domestically self-sufficient and made huge profits 
in  its  foreign  markets.74 Early on in  the  conflict,  Cinevoz (the bulletin  of  the recently formed 
Comisión Nacional de Cinematografía) declared on its front page that, in order to reopen the North 
American market, «the government of Mexico would have to impose a strong tax on films that 
arrived from beyond the [Río] Bravo.»75 For several months in 1949-1950, the two principal U.S. 
distributors  of  Mexican  motion  pictures  refused  to  import  Mexican  films  while  the  case  was 
considered by the IRS and negotiated by U.S. and Mexican diplomats. 
 
Mexican  officials  threatened  severe  limitations  on  U.S.  film  exhibition  in  Mexico  as 
retaliation for the prohibitive taxes that had forced Mexican films to withdraw from the United 
States. A leading Mexican diplomat, and expert on the film industry, defended retaliatory protection 
before  U.S.  embassy  representatives,  arguing  that  «American  films  in  Mexico  offer  serious 
competition  to  Mexican  films,  and  we  cannot  let  our  industry  die.»76 However,  despite  such 
protestations,  Mexico never  enacted the high screen quotas  it  threatened.  And, tellingly,  it  was 
Mexican producers who in  the end urged their  government not to stand up for their  long-term 
interests. Profits in the U.S. market (where ticket prices were higher than in Latin America) were 
roughly equal to the revenue derived by Mexican producers in their domestic market. The Mexican 
industry could not afford to wait out the United States. It needed to return to the U.S. market and 
was willing to forsake not only the 5% tax but also the principle of regulating the Mexican market 
for the benefit of domestic cultural and industrial development. It was the state that encouraged the 
film producers to hang tough, especially after Mexico had committed its diplomatic capital to the 
negotiations.77 
 
Despite  the  Mexican  industry’s  dependence  on  Spanish-speaking  U.S.  audiences,  the 
importance of the Mexican market was not lost on U.S. officials. The embassy recommended that 
the  State  Department  work  out  a  modus  vivendi  with  the  Mexicans  because  «the  loss  of  the 
Mexican market would deprive the United States motion picture industry of an estimated three to 
four million dollar[s]» annually. Recognizing their potential problems, U.S. producers encouraged 
the State Department to use the IRS to pressure Mexico to remove its new protectionist taxes, and 
also supported the removal of the U.S. taxes. Rather than risk the loss of an important market-
undercutting its world-wide drive for a mass-culture open door, and encouraging nationalist media 
policies in other nations-Hollywood supported the free-flow of Mexican films to U.S.  Spanish-
speaking  audiences  (it  did  not  compete  for  anyway).78 Moreover,  the  recent  development  of 
Mexico’s film industry made U.S.  producers  fear  leaving that  market,  even temporarily,  would 
dangerously stimulate Mexican production.79 
 
Mexico increased its regulation of U.S. films during the taxation controversy by requiring 
import licenses for foreign reissues.80 On one level, local U.S. diplomats interpreted this legislation 
as part of the general effort of the Mexican state to promote growth in its post war film sector-
without outrightly violating its 1942 Trade Agreement with the United States safeguarding the free-
flow  of  North  American  motion  pictures-  by  creating  internationally  nondiscriminatory, 
bureaucratic  obstacles to  the importation of U.S.  films.  But  on another  level,  the problem was 
understood as related to Mexico’s recent forced retreat from the U.S. market. While denying that the 
delays  were  retaliatory,  the  Mexican  Director  General  of  Cinematography  told  U.S.  embassy 
officials that «because of the serious situation in which Mexican producers find themselves as the 
result  of  their  temporary  loss  of  the  United  States  market»  the  entire  question  of  distributing 
Hollywood reissues was being reconsidered.81 
 
The  Chief  of  the  Motion  Picture  Unit  of  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic 
Commerce,  Nathan  Golden,  had  long  experience  supporting  Hollywood’s  global  interests.  He 
proved instrumental in resolving the IRS crisis. Understanding that Hollywood’s long-term goals 
would be served by the return of Mexican product to U.S. Hispanic audiences, he advised Mexican 
film representatives  about  how to handle their  tax problems.  In doing so,  he demonstrated the 
interest of U.S. film companies in maintaining a status quo as far as the position of Mexico in the 
global mass-culture market. As long as Mexico had important U.S. audiences, it was unlikely that it 
could or would erect protectionist barriers to U.S. exports-preserving not only Hollywood’s position 
in the Mexican market, but also its hegemony throughout the Spanish-speaking world.82  
For somewhat different reasons, U.S. diplomats in Mexico also urged accommodation with 
Mexican authorities. In protecting the interests of U.S. distributors, the embassy was more sensitive 
than the State Department to the political and ideological dynamics of the problem at hand. U.S. 
Ambassador  Walter  Thurston  warned  against  «antagonizing»  the  Mexican  government,  which 
considered the United States «morally responsible for heavy losses on the part  of the Mexican 
motion-picture industry» -owing to its forced withdrawal from U.S. markets.83 Despite the hardline 
taken by the State Department-refusing to accept the Mexican position that its IRS problems were 
retaliation for protectionism-the embassy consistently encouraged a simultaneous compromise that 
would work to the long-term political and economic advantages of the position of U.S. motion 
pictures in Mexico.84 
 
The embassy’s acceptance of Mexican linkage of the two issues facilitated the resolution of 
the  dispute,  allowing  the  Mexican  regime  to  save  face.  Eventually,  Mexican  motion  pictures 
reentered  the  U.S.  market  without  prohibitive  taxes.  Hollywood and the  State  Department  had 
defeated another  attempt to  develop the Mexican film industry through state  intervention.  U.S. 
diplomacy, in this case, offers an example of how the United States, despite its rhetoric of free trade, 
cultural  open  doors,  and  antistatism,  has  intervened  historically  in  pursuit  of  international 
hegemony. 
The embassy understood that the larger issue for Mexico was to defend its film industry-its 
leading producer of sovereign national mass culture -even if it meant limited growth in the long run. 
The IRS controversy was used to eliminate the protectionist measures. The short -term dependence 
of Mexican producers on the U.S. market made it difficult for them or for their state to effectively 
combat  U.S.  domination  of  the  Spanish-speaking  world’s  movie  screens.  In  finally  urging 
capitulation, Mexican producers had come to terms with their dependence on the U.S. market. 
 
But the negotiations between Mexico and the United States also demonstrated the space 
Mexico  could  find  to  defend  basic  interests,  even  if  it  could  not  fundamentally  change  the 
dependent position of its film industry. The Mexican film industry, state, and official ideology were 
too developed to be dictated to by Hollywood or the State Department.  The same modernizing 
forces that had created a mass market for U.S. consumer culture also had produced a relatively 
autonomous  nation.85  Mexico’s  negotiations  with  the  United  States  revealed  a  degree  of 
interdependence between the two nations’ film industries, as well as the mutual stake for U.S. and 
Mexican political elites in preserving their general alliance. 
 
The segregation of production from exhibition, and the relatively small and underdeveloped 
distribution  systems,  in  the  Mexican  industry  represented  another  dimension  of  film-sector 
dependence on the United States, adding to Mexico’s difficulty in developing effective protectionist 
policies.86 Exhibition was a huge industry that depended upon U.S. product -not only because of the 
popularity of U.S. films- but also because of the high demand for films, period. In a market forged 
principally by U.S. product, the reduction of U.S. distribution, unless instituted gradually and in a 
controlled way (something the MPPDA and the State  Department  were constantly on guard to 
obstruct)  would  destroy  the  large  privately  owned  exhibition  sector  -leaving  the  market 
undersupplied,  hurting  workers,  and  disappointing  growing  film audiences.  Given  the  credible 
threat by U.S. companies,  in their  negotiations with Mexico in the late 1940s,  that  they would 
boycott the Mexican market if protectionist measures of any kind were enacted, there was no way 
conceivable that the reduction in films would not be dramatic.87 
 
The dependence of exhibitors on U.S.  product was deeper, in many ways, than that of the 
producers on the U.S. market. Exhibitors made money by showing U.S. films and did not want to 
sacrifice those interests in the name of national production. The exhibition sector employed more 
workers than any other area of the film industry, and those workers were organized in the nationally 
powerful Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Cinematográfica (STIC). Despite serious labor 
conflict in the exhibition sector throughout the 1940s, there was a clear consensus when it came to 
the foreign interests of workers and private theater owners; both groups relied on the constant flow 
into Mexico of U.S. motionpictures.88 The local representative of the U.S. distributors believed that 
the only reason that, during the late 1940s, the Comisión Nacional de la Cinematografía had not 
been able to carry out radical programs aimed at challenging U.S. hegemony in Mexican or foreign 
film markets was «largely because of opposition to them by exhibitors who have held membership 
on  the  Commission  and  as  members  have  defended  the  interests  of  American  producers  and 
distributors.»89 
 
When serious limitations on U.S. film imports were threatened during the 1949 IRS conflict, 
organized exhibitors had made their interests clear to the regime. The president of the Asociación 
Nacional de Empresarios de Cines explained to President Miguel Alemán that national production 
«does not cover the needs of the [Mexican] market. » Beyond problems of quantity-affecting capital 
and labor -there also was the question of the qualitative demands of Mexican audiences, the masses 
who had been introduced to the movies, and the ritual of movie going, principally by U.S. films. As 
the Asociación pointed out, U.S. productions were of «of great quality» and desired by the Mexican 
public.  Moreover,  Mexican producers required contact and even competition with «the forward 
advances of the [foreign] cinematographic industry» in order to progress.90 Despite the popularity 
of national films, and whatever ambivalence Mexicans might have had about gringos or the U.S. 
government, the movie-going masses clearly adored the likes of Humphrey Bogart, James Cagney, 
Ava Gardner, and Joan Crawford, as represented not only in box office receipts for U.S. films, but 
also  in  mainstream  Mexican  popculture.91 Thus  domestic  social  factors-linked  to  the  cultural 
influence of U.S. films-were significant in limiting the postwar growth of the Mexican film industry 
. 
 
Serious  disputes  over  Mexican  foreign  film regulation  would  arise  again,  most  notably 
Mexico’s attempt to enact a 50% quota in 1950, but the same factors dominant in the 1948-1949 
confrontation  dictated  future  outcomes:  Mexico’s  dependence  on  U.S.  markets,  Hollywood’s 
involvement in various sectors of the Mexican film industry, and the State Department’s political 
and economic intervention in Mexico and other Spanish-speaking countries made radical regulation 
untenable. 
 
 
 
VII
 
The 1940s demonstrated that Mexico’s position in the world-culture system corresponded 
with its semi-peripheral standing in the world economy. Its demand for motion pictures reflected its 
relatively high level of development for a third-world nation, signified by its growing mass society. 
Also, Mexico did not just consume metropolitan mass culture, it  produced its own-reflecting its 
recent burst of industrialization. And it exported its product to peripheral areas-including Hispanic 
U.S. communities-that did not produce their own motion pictures.92 Moreover, its ability to defend, 
if not expand, its mass-cultural production, reflected the strength and complexity of its national 
political system. 
 
The  limits  of  the  postwar  Mexican  film  industry  also  underlines  its  semi-peripheral 
development. Lacking Hollywood’s organization and power -derived from its size, backward and 
forward  linkages,  its  international  organization,  its  long-standing  influence  in  Mexico,  and  the 
support of U.S. foreign policy-Mexican producers had trouble competing with U.S. companies not 
only abroad but also in their domestic market. Mexican producers also depended upon U.S. sources 
of new technologies, expertise, and virgin film; their films always lagged technically behind U.S.  
productions.  Without  heavy subsidization  -of  the  scale  received  from the  United  States  during 
World War II- Mexican producers could not afford the start-up costs of importing new equipment 
and technologies.93 
 
The postwar Mexican situation reflected the problem of trying to regulate a U.S. industry 
that established its Mexican position prior to the development of Mexico’s film industry, did not 
depend on the Mexican market, and enjoyed an international economy- of-scale. The Mexican state 
chose to support its national film industry in a state-led framework that did not directly challenge 
U.S. mass-media hegemony. The result was films of inferior quality, ultimately limited as far as 
foreign distribution. Increasingly after World War II, with the exception of certain Mexican films 
(like those of Buñuel), the U.S. and Mexican film industries settled into an international division of 
production for Spanish-speaking audiences: Mexico produced what would be termed in the United 
States  B-pictures,  while  higher-quality  North  American  imports  continued  to  dominate  Latin 
American screens. Although this relationship allowed Mexico’s aggregate share of its screentime to 
grow (especially as Hollywood’s production declined in the 1950s), it grew at a much slower rate 
after the 1940s [See Appendix]. 
 
Dependence on U.S. markets-combined with U.S. diplomatic and economic power, which 
reinforced the highly organized North American export film industry (represented by the MPPDA)-
was  the  major  factor  in  obstructing  Mexican  attempts  at  development  through increased  Latin 
American exports and moderate protection. In the end, Mexican producers, less organized than their 
vertically-integrated and internationally-combined U.S. competitors, were unable to sacrifice their 
short-term needs for long-term planning. Mexico lacked the domestic financial means and political 
power to develop a film industry that could take full advantage of international demand for its 
product.  Inevitably,  producers  turned  to  the  state  for  help.  But  it  was  unable  and unwilling to 
construct a radical system of protection that would have restricted U.S. access to Mexican screens. 
In  the  end,  the  decline  of  the  Mexican  film  industry  resulted  not  from  lack  of  domestic  or 
international  demand  for  its  films  but  from  pressures  applied  by  Hollywood  and  the  State 
department which exacerbated internal weaknesses. 
 
Would radical protectionist measures have worked? Probably not in the long- run, unless the 
Spanish-speaking world coordinated similar policies toward U.S.  films.94  As we saw in the cases 
involving Spanish, Latin American, and U.S. markets, this was goal to achieve. Because of their 
dependence on foreign markets, Mexican producers could not fully support radical protection, they 
instead looked for greater subsidization and promotion by the state. A ware of the integral role of 
mass  culture  in  postwar  foreign  policy-as  a  promoter  of  U.S.  trade,  ideology,  and  social 
engineering-and owing to the intimate relationship between Hollywood corporations and the U .S. 
government, the State Department was particularly aggressive in obstructing even modest attempts 
at cultural nationalism. Mexican exhibitors -whose strongest business links were with Hollywood 
distributors- often aided U.S. efforts to undermine state promotion of the film industry .Mexico 
learned that it was impossible for it to be a member of a capitalist, world-culture system dominated 
by the  United  States  and  at  the  same  time  build  the  internationally  competitive  film industry 
necessary in order to have a vibrant and sovereign domestic one. 
 
The Mexican film industry that seemed poised at  the end of World War II  to break the 
limitations of import-substitution industrialization, obtaining durable international markets, was in 
the end limited by the direct and indirect dependence of its three sectors on U.S. factors. The links 
between  production,  distribution,  and  exhibition  sectors  of  the  Mexican  film industry  and  the 
United States were, in the final analysis, much stronger than their links to each other. Paradoxically, 
nationalist films of the Golden Age -like Río Escondido- were the cultural product of an industrial 
situation to a large extent generated by Mexico’s World War II alliance with the United States then 
undone by the continuation of that alliance after the war. But that perhaps has been the paradox of 
the Mexican state since the 1940s (if not earlier): rhetorically nationalist but structurally aligned-
politically and economically-with its North American neighbor. 
 
 
 
Appendix: FILMS EXHIBITED IN MEXICO, 1930-1955
 
1930        1935       1940       1945       1950       1955 
 
USA        212        207         338         245          249        211
MEX           4          24           37           67          105          77
ARG           -             1           26           31              9            1
OTH         58           55           48           20          103          70
 
Source:  The  chart  was  compiled  from  data  contained  in  AMADOR,  María  Luisa  -AYALA 
BLANCO,  Jorge.  Cartelera  cinematográfica, Vols.  1-3,  México,  DF:  Centro  Universitario  de 
Estudios Cinematográficos, UNAM, 1980, 1982, 1985. 
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